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Twenty-five years ago, in Chapman v California, the Supreme
Court ruled that a federal constitutional error at a state criminal
trial requires a conviction's reversal unless the government can es-
tablish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.,
Chapman can be seen as having two holdings: first, that federal
constitutional error can be deemed harmless; and second, that fed-
eral law governs the harmlessness of such an error in a state trial.
My concern is with the second of these holdings: that federal law
often demands that state courts find errors prejudicial.
At first glance this holding hardly seems startling. For harm-
less error rules measure not only the likelihood that an error af-
fected the outcome, but also how great a likelihood the law should
deem acceptable. This normative judgment depends heavily upon
the nature of the violation itself, and thus is "inseparable from the
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1972, J.D. 1975, Harvard. I am grateful
to Dick Fallon and David Shapiro for very helpful comments, and to Arthur Long for superb
research assistance. Also, I am grateful to the Harvard Law School Summer Research Pro-
gram for providing financial support for this Article.
1 386 US 18, 23-24 (1967).
2 See id at 21-22.
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task of defining the scope of th[e] constitutional right"-and
clearly a matter of federal law.'
The Chapman opinion was cryptic, however, about the source
of the rule it announced. The Court did state that "[w]hether a
conviction for crime should stand when a State has failed to accord
federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a
federal question as what particular federal constitutional provi-
sions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they
have been denied."'4 But the "federal question" was not said to be
a constitutional question. Indeed, the Court suggested that Con-
gress might modify the standard that Chapman set forth,5 leading
Justice Harlan, in lone dissent, to object that the Court had no
authority to prescribe subconstitutional rules of procedure for the
states.6
Justice Harlan's dissent did not generate much debate in sub-
sequent years about the legal basis for the Chapman rule. Perhaps,
one might think, the Court should simply have rested the ruling
squarely on the Constitution itself.7 Under that approach, asserts
one commentator (who has written the most thorough analysis of
the basis for a federal rule of harmless error), "there would, of
course, have been little conceptual difficulty. The Supreme Court
has the power to force state courts to follow the Federal Constitu-
tion under the supremacy clause.""
Yet even if Chapman had rested squarely on the Constitution,
profound conceptual difficulty would remain. Since its 1894 deci-
sion in McKane v Durston,9 the Court has repeatedly insisted, al-
beit in dicta, that the Constitution grants criminal defendants no
right to appeal.10 At present, no state has eliminated all appellate
3 Paul M. Bator, et al, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
637 n 6 (Foundation, 3d ed 1988) ("Hart & Wechsler"). Accord, Roger J. Traynor, The
Riddle of Harmless Error 40-41 (Ohio State, 1970).
4 386 US at 21.
See id.
See id at 47-48 (Harlan dissenting).
At least one commentator reads Chapman as a "constitutional judgment." See Ste-
phen H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J Crim L & Criminology
421, 424 n 31 (1980).
8 Philip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v.
California, 53 Minn L Rev 519, 528 (1969).
9 153 US 684 (1894).
10 See, for example, Pennsylvania v Finley, 481 US 551, 555-56 (1987), quoting Ross v
Moffitt, 417 US 600, 610-11 (1974) (so stating in holding that indigent prisoners have no
federal constitutional right to appointed counsel in collateral attacks on their convictions);
Jones v Barnes, 463 US 745, 751 (1983) (so stating in finding no constitutional violation
when a convict's appointed counsel on appeal refused to press a non-frivolous issue that the
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review of serious criminal convictions,11 and perhaps these dicta no
longer command respect. But suppose a state conferred on its ap-
pellate courts jurisdiction to reverse a criminal conviction only if
the error probably affected the outcome 12 -a standard far less pro-
tective of defendants than that of Chapman. Why would affir-
mance of a conviction under that standard raise a federal question
if the state might have provided no appeal whatsoever?
For the most part, the Court and commentators have passed
by this question entirely, focusing instead on the content of the
harmless error standard.13 Thus, commentators have discussed,
often critically, the Supreme Court's extension of the range of is-
client wished to press); Ross, 417 US at 606, 611 (so stating in holding that indigent convicts
have no right to appointed counsel in connection with a second, discretionary appeal to the
state supreme court, or with a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court); McKane, 153 US at 687 (so stating in holding that a convict has no absolute right to
bail pending appeal).
A recent student note has argued that the Court essentially overruled McKane by stat-
ing in Bryant v Akron Metropolitan Park District that "the right of appeal is not essential
to due process, provided that due process has already been accorded in the tribunal of first
instance." 281 US 74, 80 (1930). Proof of constitutional error at trial, the note argues, dem-
onstrates that due process was not provided and hence triggers a right to appeal. Note, The
Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91 Colum L Rev 373, 377-78 (1991).
This argument conflates two different meanings of due process. The first is whether the
trial court's procedural rulings were correct as a matter of federal constitutional law-for
example, whether the court properly interpreted the Confrontation Clause. The second is
whether the trial court provided a fair opportunity to litigate the defendant's constitutional
claims; whether or not in deciding, for example, a Confrontation Clause issue, the trial court
in the end "got it right." See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv L Rev 441, 483-93 (1963); see particularly id at 485,
citing Frank v Mangum, 237 US 309, 334 (1915) ("[D]ue process of law. . doei not mean
that the operations of the state government shall be conducted without error. . . ."). One
could find that there is no due process right to an appeal so long as the trial process was
fair, even if another tribunal reviewing the record would conclude that the trial court had
erred.
There may be some constitutional issues-for example, the bias of a trial judge, or the
ineffectiveness of counsel-that can be adequately raised only in a post-conviction setting,
and that therefore may entail a limited right to an appeal or some other form of post-
conviction relief. See Note, 91 Colum L Rev at 378-79. But that is a far narrower argument.
" See Bundy v Wilson, 815 F2d 125, 136-42 (1st Cir 1987); Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking
the Constitutional Right to A Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L Rev 503, 513-14 (1992).
. Compare Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va L Rev 988, 1019
(1973) (criticizing a standard requiring reversal only where a conviction was "clearly
wrong").
13 See, for example, Traynor, Harmless Error (cited in note 3); Martha A. Field, Assess-
ing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of A Rationale,
125 U Pa L Rev 15, 21-58 (1976); Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Con-
stitutional Error, 88 Colum L Rev 79, 82-88 (1988). Articles that do take note of the prob-
lem include Saltzburg, 59 Va L Rev at 1028, and Mause, 53 Minn L Rev at 531 (cited in
note 8).
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sues that can be subjected to harmless error analysis,14 as when the
Court recently rejected its long-stated position that introduction of
a coerced confession requires automatic reversal.15 Also controver-
sial was the Court's decision last Term in Brecht v Abrahamson
that when federal courts determine, under their habeas corpus ju-
risdiction, whether a federal constitutional error infected a state
criminal conviction, an error should be deemed harmless unless it
"had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict."1 6 That formulation is less protective of criminal
defendants than the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard that, under Chapman, governs on direct review. More gener-
ally, there is a widespread perception that in the Supreme Court,
as well as in state and lower federal courts, errors of some sub-
stance are nonetheless found harmless so as to permit the affir-
mance of convictions.1 7 But why should a decision holding an error
harmless on appeal be controversial if the state could dispense
with appeals- altogether?
The Court's decisions fail to give much attention at all to this
question. Thus, last Term in Sullivan v Louisiana, the Court ruled
unanimously that a constitutionally deficient instruction on the
reasonable doubt standard can never be harmless error.18 But the
Court's opinion-written by Justice Scalia, who is not shy in ques-
tioning the underpinnings of established doctrines-simply ac-
cepted Chapman without question. 19 The Court's opinion in
Brecht earlier in the Term was equally silent; Justice White's dis-
'4 See, for example, Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Require-
ment, 1989 S Ct Rev 195, 207-08.
15 Arizona v Fulminante, 111 S Ct 1246, 1257 (1991). The Court's holding has been
widely criticized. See, for example, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1990
Term-Comment: Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Co-
erced Confessions, 105 Harv L Rev 152, 161-75 (1991); Tom Stacy, The Search for the
Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 Colum L Rev 1369, 1382-83 (1991); John
Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U Chi L Rev 13, 16 & n 9
(1992). I confess to seeing no reason why a coerced confession might not be deemed harm-
less, while recognizing that it will be a rare case in which harmlessness beyond a reasonable
doubt can be established.
16 113 S Ct 1710, 1714 (1993), quoting Kotteakos v United States, 328 US 750, 776
(1946).
1 See, for example, Francis A. Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-
Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice in the Courts of Review, 70 Iowa L Rev 311, 329-35 (1985);
Stacy and Dayton, 88 Colum L Rev at 127-31 (cited in note 13).
-8 113 S Ct 2078, 2081-82 (1993).
11 See id at 2081. The same is true of Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion. See id at
2083 (Rehnquist concurring).
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senting opinion in Brecht was unusual in its willingness even to
acknowledge that there is some question about the doctrine's roots:
Chapman, it is true, never expressly identified the source of
[its] harmless error standard. But, whether the standard be
characterized as a "necessary rule" of federal law, or criticized
as a quasi-constitutional doctrine, the Court clearly viewed it
as essential to the safeguard of federal constitutional rights.
Otherwise, there would have been no justification for imposing
the rule on the state courts. As far as I *can tell, the majority
does not question Chapman's vitality on direct review and,
therefore, the federal and constitutional underpinnings on
which it rests.20
I do not claim that investigation of the conceptual uncertain-
ties that underlie the federal harmless error rule will yield clear
and certain answers to all of the controversial aspects of the doc-
trine that have been debated in recent years. Still, one cannot be-
gin to think about those questions without some background un-
derstanding of the basis for the doctrine in general. I hope to
develop such an understanding in this Article.
My conclusion, in brief, is that it is not possible to reconcile
the lack of any right to a criminal appeal with a view of Chapman
as a simple constitutional decision, irreversible by Congress. In-
deed, Chapman is hard to rationalize as a decision of "pure" con-
stitutional law even if one does not take seriously the oft-repeated
dicta that there is no constitutional right to a criminal appeal.
Rather, Chapman is best viewed as a rule of constitutional com-
mon law, born of concern that state courts, if left free to apply
their own harmless error standards, would dilute federal constitu-
tional norms by too easily finding that constitutional errors were
not prejudicial. I will defend that understanding of Chapman and
proceed to explore its implications.
I. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO APPEAL?
One response to the apparent tension between Chapman and
the lack of any established right to appeal is to disparage the dec-
larations-never set forth in a case in which the right to appeal
20 113 S Ct at 1726 (White dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor's separate
dissent noted that "as Justice White observes... , one searches the majority opinion in vain
for a discussion of the basis for Chapman's harmless-error standard. We are left to specu-
late whether Chapman is the product of constitutional command or a judicial construct that
may overprotect constitutional rights." Id at 1729 (O'Connor dissenting).
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had been eliminated altogether 21-that no such right exists.22 On
this view, one notes that in practice states uniformly provide some
mechanism for appellate review23 and argues that today a state
could not constitutionally repeal or seriously restrict a right to ap-
peal, at least in a criminal case.24 I would like to explore both the
plausibility of this view and its implications for the Chapman rule.
A. The Basis for the Conventional View
The conventional view that there is no constitutional right to
appellate process rests initially and perhaps primarily on textual
and historical arguments. The Bill of Rights, though it grants
many procedural rights to criminal defendants, says nothing of a
right to an appeal. 25 No general right to an appeal existed in colo-
nial or English practice 6 or in the states at the time of the Found-
ing.27 Congress provided no such right in the federal courts when it
enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789,28 and did not confer a general
right of appeal to all federal criminal defendants until 1891.29
B. Challenges to the Received Wisdom
Several writers not concerned specifically with the issue of
harmless error have argued in favor of a federal constitutional
21 See the cases cited in note 10.
'2 See Note, 91 Colum L Rev at 377-78 (cited in note 10).
23 See text accompanying note 11.
24 Compare Bundy v Wilson, 815 F2d 125, 132-35 (1st Cir 1987) (holding unconstitu-
tional New Hampshire's policy of not guaranteeing a felony criminal defendant access to a
trial transcript and an opportunity for argument before their petition for appellate review
could be dismissed-a disposition that did not reach the merits); Arkin, 39 UCLA L Rev at
576-80 (cited in note 11) (arguing that the Supreme Court should re-examine its holding in
McKane); Note, 91 Colum L Rev at 375-86 (cited in note 10) (arguing that it would be
unconstitutional for a state to withdraw the right to appeal).
25 See Medina v California, 112 S Ct 2572, 2576 (1992) (stating that the explicitness of
Bill of Rights provisions with respect to criminal procedure counsels against implying addi-
tional protections under the Due Process Clause). See also David Rossman, "Were There
No Appeal". The History of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 J Crim L & Criminol-
ogy 518, 555 (1990) ("[N]othing in the Congressional debates over the Bill of Rights directly
addressed ... review of criminal convictions.").
26 See Arkin, 39 UCLA L Rev at 522 (cited in note 11); Rossman, 81 J Crim L &
Criminology at 541.
217 See Arkin, 39 UCLA L Rev at 521 n 79.
28 See, for example, Rossman, 81 J Crim L & Criminology at 522, 556-59.
29 Act of March 3, 1891, ch 517 § 5, 26 Stat 826. See also Arkin, 39 UCLA L Rev at
522-23; Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter concurring in the judgment)
(noting that appeals from federal convictions were not granted for "nearly a hundred
years").
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right to an appeal.30 Here I will simply try to summarize the argu-
ments they present.
1. The complexities of the history.
While not disputing the points just noted, some of these writ-
ers have insisted that a more nuanced look at historical practice
reveals difficulties with the broad claim that at common law there
was no right to an appeal. For in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries many jurisdictions followed procedures that served some
of the functions of a modern appeal, including: (a) circuit-riding or
other mechanisms whereby the views of judges of the state's high-
est court could inform a trial court decision,31 (b) post-conviction
motions,32 (c) trials before a panel of several judges,"3 (d) executive
and legislative review of criminal convictions,34 (e) trial de novo in
a higher court,3 5 and (f) in some cases, review via a writ of error."
It is obviously not easy to reason from these practices-none
of which was uniformly followed-to a right to an appeal as pres-
ently understood. Indeed, a thoughtful study of these features con-
cluded that "[t]he major justification for review of criminal convic-
tions in the eighteenth century rested on institutional rather than
individual concerns"-primarily the concern for promoting uni-
formity.37 Moreover, the various arrangements mentioned plainly
serve quite various purposes, and thus require one to consider
whether the critical feature of any claimed right to appeal is (a) a
chance to re-argue that an error was made, even before the same
judge who allegedly erred, (b) a chance to argue before different
judges that an error was made, (c) a decision informed by the
views of the jurisdiction's highest court, or (d) a decision made by
10 See, for example, Arkin, 39 UCLA L Rev at 571-80; Note, 91 Colum L Rev at 375-86
(cited in note 10); Rossman, 81 J Crim L & Criminology at 518-20; Harry G. Fins, Is the
Right of Appeal Protected By the Fourteenth Amendment?, 54 Judicature 296, 297 (1971).
1 See Rossman, 81 J Crim L & Criminology at 529-31.
'2 See Arkin, 39 UCLA L Rev at 531-32; Rossman, 81 J Crim L & Criminology at 532-
34.
33 See Rossman, 81 J Crim L & Criminology at 534-37.
3' See id at 537-39 (noting, however, that executive review (appeal to the Crown) was
"too inconvenient and costly to be of much practical significance," and was used extensively
only in Rhode Island); Arkin, 39 UCLA L Rev at 526-27.
35 See Rossman, 81 J Crim L & Criminology at 539-40.
" See Arkin, 39 UCLA L Rev at 533; Rossman, 81 J Crim L & Criminology at 541-42.
The federal practice included circuit riding (though not, of course, to hear appeals from
district court convictions), post-trial motions, opportunity in some circumstances for certifi-
cation to the Supreme Court, and limited review via habeas corpus. See Arkin, 39 UCLA L
Rev at 537-42; Rossman, 81 J Crim L & Criminology at 560-64.
3' Rossman, 81 J Crim L & Criminology at 549.
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more than one judge.38 To be sure, early American criminal prac-
tice, because it does not present a stark picture of decisions made
by a single trial judge subject to no further review, is not inconsis-
tent with the claim that some kind of review is constitutionally
required. But the historical picture hardly provides fertile soil for
such a claim.
2. Policy and contemporary practice.
A distinct strand of argument contends that whatever the his-
torical record reveals, appeals have come to have central impor-
tance in American practice. Expanded rights of defendants and
greater legal complexity increase the likelihood that errors may be
committed.3 9 Fragmentary evidence suggesting that reversal rates
in criminal appeals range from just under 5% to close to 14% in
various state systems or federal circuits, and that rates of "modifi-
cation" of judgment short of reversal are higher still, highlights the
practical importance to defendants of appellate review.40 The pro-
vision of some form of appellate review, at least in serious cases, by
the federal government and all 50 states today reflects a social con-
sensus that such review is necessary. These arguments of policy
and contemporary practice provide important support for the
claim that criminal appeals are constitutionally required.
3. The due process calculus.
Finally, some proponents of a constitutional right to a criminal
appeal rely on the open-ended balancing formulation of Mathews v
Eldridge.41 They argue that in criminal cases, the private liberty
interest is of paramount importance; the risk of erroneous convic-
tion, as just noted, is not insignificant; and the burden on the gov-
ernment cannot be deemed too heavy when considered in light of
See, for example, 4 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Appeals, Stan-
dard 21-1.2, Commentary at 21.9-21.10 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1980) (suggesting that the last
three features listed comprise the "threefold purpose" of the right to an appeal).
39 See Arkin, 39 UCLA L Rev at 574-75 (cited in note 11).
40 Id at 515-16. Of course, even a reversal may not in the end change the outcome; the
defendant might, for example, be convicted after retrial, or the case might be reversed and
remanded for a hearing that results in no relief. Compare Robert T. Roper and Albert P.
Melone, Does Procedural Due Process Make a Difference? A Study of Second Trials, 65
Judicature 136, 139 (1981) (noting that of 1159 federal criminal cases remanded after an
appeal between fiscal 1975 and 1979, the second proceeding reached a different outcome in
51.1%).
41 424 US 319 (1976).
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existing state practice uniformly providing such appeals. 2 The
First Circuit relied on just such an approach in holding unconstitu-
tional a 1979 New Hampshire rule that authorized its Supreme
Court, which was the state's only appellate court, to deny a crimi-
nal defendant's petition for review (not a decision on the merits)
without providing the defendant with either a trial transcript or an
opportunity to argue the merits.3
C. Implications of the Revisionist View
Even this brief sketch should make clear that the argument
for constitutionalizing a right to a criminal appeal, like so many
constitutional arguments, has both considerable force and obvious
difficulties. I have some sympathy for the revisionist approach,"
although there are important countervailing concerns 5 and reasons
to doubt that the current Court will follow this path.4' But even if
42 See, for example, Note, 91 Colum L Rev at 382-86 (cited in note 10) (applying the
Mathews balancing test to the right of appeal in criminal cases).
"s See Bundy v Wilson, 815 F2d 125, 131-35 (1st Cir 1987). Under the rule, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court could "in its discretion, decline to accept an appeal from a lower
court after a decision on the merits" after having reviewed only the notice of appeal. Id at
126. As summarized by the First Circuit, the notice of appeal set forth "(1) A 'brief descrip-
tion' of the nature of the case and the result. (2) The statute on which the case was based.
(3) The 'specific questions to be raised on appeal, expressed in terms and circumstances of
the case but without unnecessary detail.' (4) A list of cases supporting the movant's posi-
tion." Id at 128-29. To the notice of appeal, an appellant could append pleadings, trial court
rulings, and other material, but not an argument why an appeal should be accepted. See id
at 129.
" I confess to having accepted somewhat uncritically the conventional view that there
is no constitutional right to an appeal. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer,
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1731, 1770-71
(1991); Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65
Ind L J 291, 298 (1990).
"' The massive increase in appellate dockets in recent years suggests that the institu-
tional burden imposed by a constitutional right to appeal would be, in fact, considerable.
See Arkin, 39 UCLA L Rev at 547 (cited in note 11). Thus, notwithstanding the provision of
appeals in all 50 states, constitutionalizing a right to appeal might be thought to give insuffi-
cient weight to the third Mathews factor, the burden imposed on the government.
4' Five of the sitting Justices are on record (though generally in dicta) that there is no
right to an appeal. See Pennsylvania v Finley, 481 US 551, 555-56 (1987) (opinion of Rehn-
quist, joined by White, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia), quoting Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600,
610-11 (1974); Jones v Barnes, 463 US 745, 751 (1983) (opinion of Burger, joined by White,
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor); Murray v Giarratano, 492 US 1, 22-23 (1989)
(Stevens dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) (dictum) (conceding that
there is generally no right to an appeal in a non-capital case).
In Jones, Justice Blackmun refused to join the opinion of the Court because he found it
unnecessary to decide "whether there is or is not a constitutional right to a first appeal of a
criminal conviction.. . .' 463 US at 754 (Blackmun concurring in judgment). More recently,
however, he joined in Justice Stevens's dissent in Murray, 492 US at 22-23 (Stevens dissent-
ing), conceding, albeit in dictum, that there is generally no right to an appeal.
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the argument for a constitutional right to an appeal (at least in
serious criminal cases) were accepted, what implications would
that right have for harmless error doctrine?
Presumably, chief among the purposes of recognizing such a
right would be to reduce the likelihood that a defendant has been
convicted at a trial that violated his rights, constitutional or other-
wise. To promote that purpose, an appeal must promise reversal of
the conviction in appropriate cases. But what are "appropriate
cases?" Surely not every error demands reversal. Limits upon ap-
pellate relief when a defendant violates state procedural rules (as
by failing to file a timely notice of appeal) 47 or limits on reversal
when an error is unquestionably harmless would be permissible.
Still, an unduly broad conception of harmlessness (for example,
one requiring the defendant to prove that the -error probably af-
fected the outcome) could threaten the right to reversal that would
be encompassed by such a right to appeal. Hence, a federal right to
appeal would have to include some limits on what errors a state
can deem harmless.
But even this approach would remain hard-pressed to explain
Chapman's doctrine. For under Chapman, federal law governs the
There are strong reasons to believe that Justice Souter will also subscribe to the no-
right-to-appeal position. While on the New Hampshire Supreme Court, he joined a decision
upholding the constitutionality of the New Hampshire Supreme Court rule and stressing the
lack of any right to a criminal appeal. See State v Cooper, 498 A2d 1209, 1211-12, 1216 (NH
1985). In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, the First Circuit held the rule unconstitu-
tional. See Bundy, 815 F2d at 131-35 (discussed in note 43).
Justices Kennedy and Thomas also appear likely to adopt the conventional position.
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court in Medina v California, 112 S Ct 2572,
2576-77 (1992), which, in upholding the constitutionality of placing on a criminal defendant
the burden of proof as to his competency to stand trial, suggested that the Mathews balanc-
ing test had little if any relevance in criminal cases. Justice Kennedy declared that because
"[t]he Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure," the
Court, rather than expanding "those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric
of the Due Process Clause," should ask only whether the challenged provision "offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental." Id at 2576-77, quoting Patterson v New York, 432 US 197, 202 (1977)
(internal quotations omitted). Justice Thomas, who generally finds originalist arguments at-
tractive and takes a narrow view of constitutional rights, also joined Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion in Medina.
Compare Whitmore v Arkansas, 495 US 149, 167 (1990) (Marshall dissenting) ("This
Court has held that the Constitution does not require States to provide appellate review of
noncapital criminal cases."), and Pennzoil v Texaco, 481 US 1, 31 & n 4 (1987) (Stevens
concurring in the judgment) (same view of precedent), with Jones, 463 US at 756 n 1 (Bren-
nan, joined by Marshall, dissenting) (arguing that the majority's statement that no right
exists was unnecessary and "quite arguably wrong").
"I See, for example, Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99
Harv L Rev 1128, 1133-35, 1145 (1986).
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harmlessness only of federal constitutional errors; whether errors
of state law are to be treated as harmless is left to the states. But if
the goal of a right to an appeal is to avoid erroneous convictions,
the correction of a state trial court's errors in applying local evi-
dence rules or in instructing the jury on the elements of a criminal
offense can be just as important as the correction of constitutional
errors.48 Thus, federal limits on harmless error drawn from a right
to appeal would seem to encompass all errors, not just those of
federal constitutional law.
Moreover, acceptance of a constitutional right to appeal can-
not explain why all courts reviewing a criminal conviction must ap-
ply federal harmless error rules. It seems implausible that the Con-
stitution could require more than one appeal. Thus, if a state
intermediate appellate court affirmed a trial court judgment, the
convicted defendant would have no constitutional right to a fur-
ther appeal to the state supreme court, or indeed to the United
States Supreme Court.49 Therefore, the state supreme court would
be free to apply whatever harmless error rule it wished. Yet all
state courts have been assumed to be obliged to apply Chapman
when reviewing criminal convictions.
These and other difficulties50 suggest that even if a constitu-
tional right to an appeal were recognized, at least the current ver-
4 This point is implicit in Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12, 18-19 (1956), which held that
where trial transcripts are necessary for a state court defendant effectively to appeal, they
must be made available to indigent appellants. That a convict could obtain a transcript in
state post-conviction processes did not cure the problem, the plurality noted, as those
processes were limited to constitutional issues. See id at 15 (opinion of Black).
Professor Fallon has argued that when Article III courts review decisions by non-Article
III tribunals, constitutional issues-at least issues of law-deserve special treatment. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101
Harv L Rev 915, 975-76 (1988). But see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review,
85 Colum L Rev 229, 267-71 (1985), criticizing the view that the Constitution requires "ap-
pellate courts to exercise independent judgment on adjudicative facts decisive of constitu-
tional law application." Professor Fallon later appears to argue that all questions of law
require review. See Fallon, 101 Harv L Rev at 976-82. His argument rests upon special con-
cerns about the separation of powers, as well as about fairness to litigants.
Neither concern is particularly apposite in the context of harmless error. Separation of
powers requirements are generally inapplicable to state governments. See Crowell v Benson,
285 US 22, 57 (1932); Dreyer v Illinois, 187 US 71, 83-84 (1902); Meltzer, 65 Ind L J at 296
(cited in note 44). Moreover, unlike non-Article III tribunals and Article III courts, state
trial and appellate courts are both part of the judicial branch. And as a practical matter,
fairness to litigants may depend as much on the correct application of state as of federal
law.
4 The latter point raises additional complexities. See note 88.
50 To premise the Chapman rule on a right to appeal, one would also need to determine
whether the right extends to all criminal cases (even traffic offenses?), and exactly what
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sion of harmless error doctrine does not follow easily. It remains to
explore other possible sources for existing doctrine.
II. OTHER POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE POWER TO
TREAT ERRORS AS HARMLESS
Are there other possible constitutional provisions that might
provide the basis for Chapman-and that might explain why,
though a state may constitutionally dispense with appeals alto-
gether, it lacks the freedom to follow whatever harmless error stan-
dard it deems appropriate? A short answer is that the greater
power does not always include the lesser: sometimes it does, some-
times it does not, and often it is exceedingly difficult to tell which
cases are which.5' Is there, however, a persuasive argument for
holding that the greater power to dispense with an appeal does not
carry with it the lesser power to remedy only those constitutional
errors that an appellate court finds, for example, have probably af-
fected the outcome?
A. Prohibitions Against Discrimination
Although states need not provide appeals, once they do so the
means they adopt are subject to other constitutional requirements,
indluding the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause.52 A state
may not restrict appeal rights to persons who are white or Protes-
tant or whose last names begin with Q. The Supreme Court's hold-
ings that states may not constitutionally deny indigent appellants
free transcripts;53 or appointed counsel, 54 or the effective assistance
of counsel on appeal55 can be similarly explained: at least as to
aspects of the appellate process that are "integral" to the state's
form of appellate process is constitutionally required. See Saltzburg, 59 Va L Rev at 1028 n
148 (cited in note 12). See also text accompanying notes 30-38.
See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv L Rev
1413, 1421-42, 1456-68 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987
Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent,
102 Harv L Rev 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problems of Nega-
tive Rights in a Positive State, 132 U Pa L Rev 1293, 1304-14, 1326-51 (1984).
52 See Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12, 34-38 (1956) (Harlan dissenting); Scott H. Bice, The
Limited Grant of Certiorari and the Justification of Judicial Review, 1975 Wis L Rev 343,
374.
" Griffin, 351 US at 18-19.
Douglas v California, 372 US 353, 356-58 (1963).
11 Evitts v Lucey, 469 US 387, 396 (1985).
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criminal justice system, discrimination on the basis of wealth is
constitutionally invidious.5
6
A more difficult case would be presented by a state statute
authorizing appeals but barring consideration of free speech claims
(even, for example, in criminal convictions for obscenity). Such a
limitation on appellate review would not discriminate invidiously
against indigents or against any suspect class, but it might none-
theless be constitutionally vulnerable. First, well-established law
bars states, in conferring jurisdiction on their courts, from discrim-
inating against federal rights-although a state that precluded re-
view of free speech claims based on the state as well as the federal
constitution would less obviously be engaged in such discrimina-
tion. 5 7 Second, some have argued (although I am not convinced)
that a government denies equal protection when it distinguishes
among constitutional rights and grants litigants fewer opportuni-
ties to litigate some rights than others.5 8
Be The Griffin decision referred to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to-
gether, see 351 US at 18, and Douglas referred generally to the Fourteenth Amendment, see
372 US at 356-58, although the key concern in both was invidious discrimination against the
poor. See Griffin, 351 US at 16-19, 28-29 (Burton and Minton dissenting), 34 (Harlan dis-
senting); Douglas, 372 US at 354-58. In Ross v Moffitt, the Court accurately remarked that
"[t]he precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly
stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment. Neither Clause by
itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the result reached ... ." 417 US 600, 608-09
(1974). On the due process argument, see note 59.
The equal protection argument finds echoes in discussions of congressional control of
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which conventionally distinguish between "internal
restraints"-possible limits, drawn from Article Ill itself, on congressional power to legislate
with respect to the jurisdiction of Article III courts-and "external restraints"-limits im-
posed by other constitutional provisions (such as the Equal Protection Clause or the First
Amendment) on such congressional power. See, for example, Hart & Wechsler at 383-84
(cited in note 3).
57 See, for example, Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356, 370-75, 379-81 (1990). I would have
thought the state would not be engaged in discrimination when analogous state and federal
claims are treated identically. But Felder v Casey, 487 US 131, 134 (1988), suggests other-
wise. There, the Court refused to permit a state court to apply a state notice-of-claim stat-
ute in an action under 42 USC § 1983. Id at 153. The statute conditioned the right to sue a
governmental body or one of its officers in state court on the plaintiff's having provided
notice to the putative defendant within 120 days of the alleged injury. See id at 136; Wis
Stat § 893.80(1)(a) (1983 & Supp 1987). Although the statute treated federal law and state
law claims no differently, the Court found that the statute discriminated against federal
civil rights actions. See Felder, 487 US at 138-41, 145. I believe that this is a doubtful basis
for a result that could have been justified on other grounds. See Paul M. Bator et al, Hart &
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 1993 Supplement 68, 79-82 (Foun-
dation) ("Hart & Wechsler Supplement").
58 Compare Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored
Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 Harv CR-CL L Rev 129, 135-56 (1982) (Congress may
not constitutionally restrict the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction to enforce "disfa-
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But even were one to accept either of these difficult argu-
ments, a state rule that treats as harmless any error that probably
did not affect the outcome seems easily distinguished. It discrimi-
nates neither against federal rights in general (federal and state
errors are treated no differently in determining their harmlessness)
nor against particular federal rights. Nor does it seem irrational to
distinguish errors that probably did not affect the outcome from
those that probably did. The Chapman rule similarly distinguishes
between harmless and prejudicial errors, albeit with a narrower
view of when errors are harmless. Whatever the merits of a broader
or narrower view, the narrower view hardly lacks a rational basis.5 9
Thus, harmless error rules do not run afoul of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
B. Unconstitutional Conditions
One situation in which the greater power does not include the
lesser is when a law creates an "unconstitutional condition." For
example, that a state need not establish public libraries at all does
not give it the lesser power to set up libraries restricted to Demo-
cratic users.60 If states need not provide criminal appeals, does a
similar principle require states, if they do provide such appeals, to
observe a federal standard of harmless error?
Here, too, the constitutional argument fails short. For to ob-
ject that a state cannot condition its appeals on enforcement of a
vored" rights while exercising jurisdiction over other constitutional claims), with Hart &
Wechsler at 383-84 (cited in note 3), and Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail
Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan L Rev
895, 916-22 (1984) (questioning that argument).
"8 The Court's decisions voiding rules that disadvantage indigent appellants might be
traced to the Due Process Clause. In Douglas, Justice Harlan's dissent argued that the
Equal Protection Clause was inapposite, as the state is not obliged to redress economic im-
balances. See 372 US at 362 (Harlan dissenting). His position has generally been accepted in
subsequent cases. See, for example, San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez,
411 US 1, 27-29 (1973). Although Justice Harlan had dissented in Griffin, 351 US at 27-37
(Harlan dissenting) (arguing against requiring the state to provide free transcripts to indi-
gent criminal appellants), his dissent in Douglas accepted Griffin as a due process holding.
See Douglas, 372 US at 361 n 1 (Harlan dissenting). Justice Harlan then framed the ques-
tion posed in Douglas as "whether the State's rules with respect to the appointment of
counsel are so arbitrary or unreasonable, in the context of the particular appellate proce-
dure that it has established, as to require their invalidation." Id at 365 (emphasis in origi-
nal). See also Lucey, 469 US at 401 ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its action
has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of
the Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause."); Bice, 1975
Wis L Rev at 374-75 (cited in note 52). A test of reasonableness or non-arbitrariness is much
the same whether framed under the Due Process or the Equal Protection Clause.
80 See, for example, Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1421-28 (cited in note 51).
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harmless error standard less favorable to defendants than Chap-
man requires some independent explanation of why the Constitu-
tion requires the Chapman standard-an analogue to the First
Amendment right of library patrons not to belong to the Demo-
bratic party. Thus, the argument is incomplete and returns us to
the problem of establishing the right to application of the Chap-
man standard absent any established right to an appeal in a crimi-
nal case.
Moreover, "[n]ot all constitutional rights are implicated in un-
constitutional conditions cases. By its very nature, the doctrine
serves to protect only those rights that depend on some sort of
exercise of autonomous choice by the rightholder, such as individ-
ual rights to speech, exercise of religion[,] or privacy.... ."'I Condi-
tioning library access (or criminal appeals) on membership in the
Democratic party interferes with an individual's freedom to exer-
cise constitutional rights. But a state law providing that one's con-
viction may be reversed only by proving that the error probably
affected the outcome does not create pressure to change one's pri-
mary behavior so as to forgo the exercise of constitutional rights.
For these reasons, a state harmless error rule does not fall within
the doctrine that proscribes unconstitutional conditions.
C. Marbury v Madison, The Rule of Law, and the Justification
for Judicial Review
Can we make sense of the Chapman rule as a matter of judi-
cial integrity required by due process or by fundamental presup-
positions about judicial review? The argument would begin with
the basic premise that, like other courts, appellate courts with ju-
risdiction over a case are obliged to apply the Constitution. After
all, the primary justification for judicial review in Marbury v
Madison was that the Court was obliged to apply all the relevant
law, including the Constitution, to a case at bar.6 2 The argument
would then conclude that application of the Constitution demands
reversal of convictions tainted by constitutional error, unless the
Chapman standard can be satisfied.
The basic premise, though correct as applied in certain cir-
cumstances, fails to sustain the argument as applied here. Marbury
was, after all, a case brought in the Supreme Court's original juris-
41 Id at 1426.
" 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitu-
tion, 65 Colum L Rev 1001, 1005-06 (1965); Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1771
(cited in note 44).
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diction.e It is easy enough to find that a trial court, particularly in
an enforcement action, is obliged to apply all of the law; a defen-
dant may not constitutionally be sanctioned by a court without
having had an opportunity that comports with due process to
make his defenses.6 4 It is quite a different question whether an ap-
pellate court is obliged to decide all the issues that had been before
the trial court, particularly if we assume that criminal appeals, un-
like criminal trials, are constitutionally gratuitous.
Indeed, well-entrenched practice calls into question whether
an appeal must extend to every issue in a case. The Supreme Court
has long granted certiorari limited to particular issues.6 5 If Con-
gress may authorize the Court to exercise jurisdiction without de-
ciding every issue raised by the litigants, why may not a state give
its appellate courts jurisdiction to reverse only on the basis of cer-
tain kinds of errors-those most likely to have been prejudicial?66
Indeed, a distinction between more or less prejudicial errors may
be easier to justify than one distinguishing between more or less
"important" issues.67
63 See Bice, 1975 Wis L Rev at 390-400 (cited in note 52).
61 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv L Rev 1362, 1374-83 (1953); Alfred Hill, Constitu-
tional Remedies, 69 Colum L Rev 1109, 1111-12 (1969).
'5 See generally Bice, 1975 Wis L Rev at 346-62.
66 Similarly, when states establish post-conviction review mechanisms, the courts' juris-
diction is sometimes limited to errors deemed "fundamental." See, for example, Reeves v
State, 726 SW2d 366, 367 (Mo App 1987); Maxfield v State, 700 P2d 115, 121 (Idaho App
1985); Woodard v State, 617 SW2d 861, 864 (Ark 1981). See also Cutbirth v State, 751 P2d
1257, 1261 (Wyo 1988) (holding that post-conviction relief is limited to questions "of consti-
tutional magnitude which manifest a miscarriage of justice"). I know of no cases that have
required states to hear every issue simply because they have agreed to hear others. If ap-
peals are just as much a constitutional gratuity as state collateral remedies, it is not appar-
ent why states should not have equal latitude in deciding which issues merit reversal on
appeal.
17 See note 58. Perhaps one can argue that the practice of limited grants of certiorari
preserves a considerable measure of judicial integrity, for the decision not to review a partic-
ular issue is made by a court, not a legislature. Thus, in the context of a petition for certio-
rari, every litigant has the opportunity to have all issues heard by the Court. Compare Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 BU L Rev 205, 267-69 (1985) (arguing that discretionary Supreme Court
review on certiorari is consistent with the letter of Article III, but may violate its spirit). By
contrast, insofar as a state harmless error rule is legislatively prescribed, a court could be
precluded from granting relief that it deemed necessary or appropriate.
Yet given current certiorari practice, a particular litigant's opportunity to obtain Su-
preme Court review is only theoretical. In a state criminal case, for example, the likelihood
that the Supreme Court, when it grants review on some cert-worthy issue, would also review
a garden-variety challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson v Virginia, 443
US 307, 324 (1979), or a claim that the police lacked probable cause in making an arrest, is
very small indeed-not simply in practice but by design. See generally H.W. Perry, Jr.,
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There is a second difficulty with the view that application of
state law harmless error rules would preclude a court from apply-
ing "all the law." As Richard Fallon and I have argued, the ques-
tion whether to reverse a judgment on appeal (or more generally
after conviction) is best viewed as a question of the law of reme-
dies.68 Harmless error doctrine addresses "whether a particular
form of relief-the reversal of a conviction or the vacation of a
judgment-should be available to redress the past wrong. '6 9 Thus,
a court that denies relief in the face of a meritorious claim that
there was constitutional error at trial does not necessarily ignore
its obligation to apply all of the law. It may well apply the Consti-
tution in finding that the conduct at trial was illegal, but that find-
ing alone does not dictate reversal, for the appropriate remedy for
any such violation is a separate question.70 Though always unset-
tling, it is hardly exceptional for appellate courts, or indeed courts
more generally, to withhold remedies for violations of constitu-
tional wrongs.71
A regime whose broad conception of harmlessness often called
for withholding the remedy of reversal might prompt the objection
that a state should not be able to confer legitimacy upon a criminal
conviction by authorizing a toothless form of appellate review. A
similar argument has been made in the context of limitations on
the power of Article III courts to review decisions of non-Article
Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court (Harvard, 1991);
Bice, 1975 Wis L Rev at 353 (cited in note 52). Thus, the practice of certiorari review would
at the very least be in tension with the "spirit" of any principle requiring appellate courts to
hear all issues in a case. See Amar, 65 BU L Rev at 267-69. See also Daniel J. Meltzer, The
History and Structure of Article III, 138 U Pa L Rev 1569, 1616-17 n 176 (1990) (arguing
that under Amar's view, the Court's certiorari policy may also violate the letter of Article
III).
Of course, the economy rationale that underlies a limited grant of certiorari has greater
force in a jurisdiction's highest court than in intermediate appellate courts that hear a first
appeal as of right. See Bice, 1975 Wis L Rev at 377-78 (cited in note 52). But that difference
in the force of policy concerns does not translate easily into a difference between the consti-
tutionality of the practice in a state's highest courts and in its intermediate courts. Indeed,
there remain some states in which the right to any appellate review in criminal cases is
discretionary. See Bundy v Wilson, 815 F2d 125, 128-29, 141 (1st Cir 1987); NH S Ct Rule
7(1), in 1 NH Court Rules Ann (Equity 1992); Va Code Ann § 17-116.07 (Michie 1988 &
1993 Cum Supp); Va S Ct Rule 5A:12(e), 5:17, in Va Rules Ann (Michie 1992); W Va Rule
App P 7, in W Va Rules Ann (Michie 1992).
"8 See Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1770-73 (cited in note 44).
" Id at 1770.
70 See id at 1771-73. Of course, a court might decide that an alleged constitutional vio-
lation was harmless without determining whether in fact a violation had occurred.
71 See id at 1779-86.
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III federal tribunals. 2 But there are a number of difficulties with
this argument. First, such claims about legitimacy and judicial in-
tegrity always have a somewhat evanescent quality. Second, insofar
as the argument rests upon Article III, it has no application to
state courts."3 Third, the argument has not been accepted even for
Article III courts. For when the Supreme Court grants certiorari
limited to a single issue and then affirms a conviction, it too can be
seen as lending legitimacy to a conviction that might in some sense
be unconstitutional, if the unredressed constitutional violation fell
outside the scope of the grant of certiorari.74
Finally, insofar as it is known that an appellate court lacks
authority to reverse, it is uncertain how great the imprimatur of
legitimacy would be. Indeed, to take the polar case, suppose that a
state appellate court were given broad jurisdiction in criminal ap-
peals to declare that the appellant had suffered an egregious viola-
tion of his constitutional rights at trial, but no power to reverse the
conviction.75 An "affirmance" by such a court would not obviously
legitimate the conviction.
The polar case points the way, however, to a different objec-
tion to broad state harmless error rules. Surely, the argument goes,
an appellate finding of a constitutional violation must entail some
corresponding entitlement on the part of the defendant to obtain a
remedy, unless the error is truly harmless as defined by an appro-
priate standard (such as that in Chapman). But even in the polar
case, if there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to an appeal,
there cannot be any entailed right to the remedy of reversal.
I thus conclude that if one accepts the traditional view that
appeals are constitutional gratuities, it is difficult to develop a con-
stitutional argument that would justify the Supreme Court's re-
quiring the state courts to follow the Chapman rule.7 6
72 See Fallon, 101 Harv L Rev at 942 (cited in note 48), arguing that in reviewing ad-
ministrative action, Article III courts perform, in part, a legitimatizing function.
71 See note 48.
71' See Bice, 1975 Wis L Rev at 346-56 (cited in note 52) (discussing the Court's use of
the limited grant of certiorari to decide some, but not all, of the constitutional issues
presented in'a case).
71 Such a practice would raise no federal constitutional problems under Article III, as
state courts are not bound by that provision's case or controversy requirement. See gener-
ally William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudica-
tion of Federal Questions, 78 Cal L Rev 263, 265-294 (1990).
76 Some have suggested that the harmless error rule might be viewed as an implication
of the right to jury trial. See Mause, 53 Minn L Rev at 531 (cited in note 8); see also
Saltzburg, 59 Va L Rev at 1028-29 (cited in note 12) (stating that harmless error implicates
the right to jury trial but noting that the Court has never held that appeals are constitution-
ally required). The argument holds that appellate affirmance is analogous to a retrial of a
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III. FEDERAL STATUTES
If the Chapman doctrine does not follow easily from any con-
stitutional doctrine, are there federal statutes or court rules that
could be interpreted as prescribing the Chapman standard? Argu-
ments that would root Chapman in these enactments also strike
me as unconvincing.
A. Federal Enactments Relating to Harmless Error
In his book The Riddle of Harmless Error, Justice Traynor
thought it odd that the Chapman Court "chose not to proceed on
the basis of Section 2111 [of Title 28] and [FRCrP] 52(a) though
the question of harmless error involved the interpretation and ap-
plication of those provisions. ' '77
As to Rule 52(a), the difficulty is easily seen. That rule, like
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure more generally, is not
designed to regulate state court cases.7 8 Just as the federal rules
defendant's case, and that such a retrial by judges rather than juries would violate the Sixth
Amendment unless the appellate court were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any
error would not have affected the jury's decision. See Mause, 53 Minn L Rev at 531.
The analogy of appellate review to retrial, however, is obviously strained. Indeed, if one
accepts the premise, one might conclude that only a jury could decide whether an error
might have affected the outcome-thus requiring automatic reversal in every case. More-
over, an appeal, even if accompanied by a broad harmless error rule, can make defendants
better off only if it undercuts the jury trial right no more (indeed, far less) than providing
no appeal at all. (A similar problem besets any theory that seeks to ground the harmless
error rule in the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397
US 358, 364 (1970); Saltzburg, 59 Va L Rev at 1028-29.) A distinct problem for the right to
jury trial theory is that it would not comprehend appeals when the defendant had waived
his right to jury trial, or was convicted only of a petty crime-to which the jury right does
not extend. See Baldwin v New York, 399 US 66, 69 (1970); Saltzburg, 59 Va L Rev at 1028
n 146.
In the end, neither the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt nor the jury trial right
could easily have been the unstated basis for Chapman itself, for neither right was incorpo-
rated against the states until after Chapman was decided in 1967. See Winship, 397 US at
364; Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 149 (1968).
7 Traynor, Harmless Error at 42 (cited in note 3). Harmless error provisions are also
found in FRCP 61 and FRE 103(a).
A nearby section in the judicial code, 28 USC § 2106 (1988), states:'
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify,
vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought
before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropri-
ate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be
just under the circumstances.
From this general procedural language authorizing courts to do their jobs, it is hard to infer
a specific substantive standard regulating harmless error.
" The language of FRCrP 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in all criminal proceed-
ings in the courts of the United States, as provided in Rule 54(a) . . . ") is somewhat less
clear on this point than the counterpart provision in FRCP 1 ("These rules govern the pro-
The University of Chicago Law Review
governing grand juries" or the manner of taking guilty pleas 0 gov-
ern neither state courts nor Supreme Court review of state court
proceedings, neither does Rule 52(a).
Section 2111 presents a somewhat more complicated question.
Its language appears to encompass Supreme Court review of state
court cases: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in
any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."'" Yet the statute enjoins the
Court to ignore errors that do not affect substantial rights; it does
not mandate reversal where substantial rights are affected. 2
That observation gains force when one recalls the impulse for
the statute's enactment. In the nineteenth century, "[a]ppellate
courts in this country were wont to hold that an error raised a pre-
sumption of prejudice or called for automatic reversal, and they
reversed judgments for the most trivial errors," becoming "'im-
pregnable citadels of technicality.' "83 The 1919 Act that was the
predecessor to § 2111 was one fruit of a long reform campaign
seeking to relieve appellate courts from the perceived obligation to
reverse whenever error was detected. 4 Thus, the thrust of the
Act-to permit appellate courts to affirm convictions they might
otherwise have reversed-was just the opposite of the aspect of
Chapman at issue here. In light of this history, the Court's failure
in Chapman to find that § 2111 imposed on the states an obliga-
cedure in the United States district courts . . ."). See also Charles A. Wright, 1 Federal
Practice and Procedure, Criminal § 21 at 22-23 (West, 2d ed 1982); James W. Moore, 8
Moore's Federal Practice § 1.02 at 1-6 (Matthew Bender, 2d ed 1992 and Aug 1993 Cum
Supp); Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, 4 Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil
§ 1012 at 56 (West, 2d ed 1987); James W. Moore and Jo Desha Lucas, 2 Moore's Federal
Practice § 1.03[1] at 1-23 (Matthew Bender, 2d ed 1993).
11 See FRCrP 6.
10 See FRCrP 11.
81 28 USC § 2111 (1992).
8 Justice Traynor's focus on the statute does, however, highlight one oddity: Was the
statute designed to reject the view that some or all constitutional errors could never be
harmless? Traynor, Harmless Error at 42 (cited in note 3). Insofar as cases before or after
Chapman took that view, one would have thought that they would have had to find the
statute either inapplicable or unconstitutional. But there appears to be no discussion of this
question in the case law.
13 Id at 13, 14, quoting Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Crimi-
nal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 ABA J 217, 222 (1925).
84 See, for example, Kotteakos v United States, 328 US 750, 758-60 (1946); Edson R.
Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 Tex L Rev 126, 146-47 (1927); Special
Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Un-
necessary Cost in Litigation, Ninth Annual Report, 2 ABA J 603, 604-07 (1916).
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tion not to find too many errors harmless seems to me unsurprising
and probably correct.8 5
Two further difficulties stand in the way of resting Chapman
on § 2111. First, the statutory text hardly makes clear that it
means to regulate the standards of harmlessness applied by the
states in their own courts, rather than by the Supreme Court on
review of state court decisions.86 Second, though Chapman
prescribes a stricter test of harmlessness for constitutional than for
non-constitutional errors, the history surrounding passage of the
statute provides no reason to think that it was meant to treat dif-
ferent kinds of errors differently.8 7
B. The Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction
Can one premise the Chapman rule on the need to protect the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction? 88 If the Court had not im-
8 In Brecht v Abrahamson, 113 S Ct 1710 (1993), the Court stated: "After examining
existing harmless-error rules, including the federal rule (28 USC § 2111), we held [in Chap-
man] 'that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id at 1717, quoting
Chapman, 386 US at 24. This somewhat ambiguous reference to § 2111 does not seem to
me to suggest that the Court now views Chapman as having relied on § 2111. Indeed, the
Brecht Court later notes that "to date we have limited [§ 2111's] application to claims of
nonconstitutional error in federal criminal cases," and that "[iun the absence of any express
statutory guidance from Congress, it remains for this Court to determine what harmless-
error standard applies on collateral review of petitioner's ... claim." 113 S Ct at 1718-19.
86 The textual doubt is reinforced by the treatment of the harmless error provision in
the 1948 Revision of the Judicial Code. The Revision repealed the 1919 statute on the view
that the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure contained all the necessary provi-
sions. See Act of Feb 26, 1919, ch 48, 40 Stat 1181, codified at Judicial Code of 1911 § 269,
repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch 646 § 39, 62 Stat 992. See Charles A. Wright and
Arthur R. Miller, 11 Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2881 at 272 (West, 1973). In
1949, however, Congress enacted current § 2111 out of concern that the Federal Rules ap-
plied only to the district courts, not to the Supreme Court or to the courts of appeals. Act of
May 24, 1949, ch 139 § 110, 63 Stat 105, codified at 28 USC § 2111; see also HR Rep No
352, 81st Cong, 1st Sess 18 (1949), in 1949 USCCAN 1248, 1272. There may have been little
basis in fact for that concern. See, for example, Wright & Miller, 11 Federal Practice § 2881
at 272. Thus, the statute, like the federal rules, was designed with federal court litigation in
mind. Indeed, it is difficult to interpret the statute as protecting the federal rights of state
court litigants, given that (i) its enactment was thought necessary merely to fill a gap in the
federal rules, and (ii) under 28 USC § 2072, the Supreme Court may not exercise its
rulemaking power so as to "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." See also note
85 (discussing Brecht).
"7 See Traynor, Harmless Error at 57 (cited in note 3).
" Arguments have been made that Article III confers upon state court litigants a con-
stitutional right to Supreme Court review. See generally Hart & Wechsler at 379-87 (cited
in note 3) (summarizing diverse arguments). Although I am skeptical about such arguments,
see Meltzer, 138 U Pa L Rev at 1573-1613 (cited in note 67), one need not resolve that
question here, for Congress has not created significant "exceptions" to the Court's appellate
jurisdiction so as to interfere with any such right. Compare the arguments cited in note 58.
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posed a federal standard of harmlessness upon the state courts,
they could have followed a rule, for example, that treated all con-
stitutional errors as harmless unless the defendant could prove
that the error probably affected the verdict."9 Under such a rule,
state appellate courts would often find that the defendant had no
right to reversal, whether or not constitutional error had occurred.
If the defendant then sought Supreme Court review, under conven-
tional doctrine the Court would lack jurisdiction because the state
court judgment would rest on an adequate and independent state
ground.90 And so, the argument would go, leaving states free to ap-
ply their own harmless error rules could undercut the role of the
Supreme Court in ensuring the uniformity and supremacy of fed-
eral law.9'
Does it follow that in order to protect its role, the Supreme
Court must displace the rules applied in the state courts with a
federal standard of harmlessness? I think not. For the only dis-
placement needed is for the Court to be free to treat the state, law
ground underlying the state court judgment as inadequate to block
Supreme Court review.9 2 So long as its jurisdiction is not blocked,
the Court does not have to impose upon the state courts any obli-
gation to depart from their ordinary harmless error rules.9 3
The question whether the .Chapman rule is required to protect the appellate jurisdiction
that the Court does possess is not dependent upon the scope of Congress's power to narrow
that jurisdiction.
"9 In fact, most states had rules less strict than that prescribed in Chapman. See
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 Harv L Rev 69, 206 n 12 (1967).
10 See Chapman, 386 US at 46 (Harlan dissenting); Mause, 53 Minn L Rev at 529 (cited
in note 8).
11 Richard Fallon and I have noted that the possibility that an error may be found
harmless under Chapman-or, to put the point more generally, that no remedy for an al-
leged constitutional violation may be provided-does not preclude a court from deciding
whether a violation occurred. See Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1797-1807 (cited in
note 44). But our premise was that the standard of harmlessness is governed by federal law,
so that a court applying that standard is simply deciding which of two federal issues it will
first decide. If the standard for harmlessness were governed by state law, then Supreme
Court review would be barred under conventional doctrine. See generally Alfred Hill, The
Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum L Rev 943, 944-98 (1965).
92 Insofar as the argument is based upon the claim that there is a special need (consti-
tutional or statutory) for Supreme Court review of state court judgments, it would not nec-
essarily extend to Supreme Court review of federal judgments. Still, one could argue that
Congress cannot have intended more intensive review of state court judgments than of fed-
eral judgments, and hence the Court's treatment of harmless error should not differ when
reviewing state and federal judgments.
91 A different route to the same result would be to treat application of the state's (less
strict) harmless error rule, in cases in which the error is found to be harmless, as tanta-
mount to a denial of appellate review. In such a situation, the Supreme Court may review
the decision of a trial court. See, for example, Thompson v City of Louisville, 362 US 199,
[61:1
Harmless Error
In a related context-that of a state court judgment denying
review on the ground that the criminal defendant failed to raise his
federal constitutional claim in accordance with state procedures-I
have argued that a Supreme Court decision finding that state
ground inadequate should be viewed as creating a kind of federal
common law, which does bind the state courts to treat the proce-
dural rule as invalid when applied to similar cases.9 4 But the prem-
ise for my argument was that the state procedural rule was held
inadequate because it failed to give adequate protection to federal
rights-a federal concern as applicable in the state courts as in the
small minority of cases that the Supreme Court actually reviews.9 5
If the argument for displacing state harmless error rules is not that
they fail to give adequate protection to federal rights, but rather
that they threaten to block Supreme Court review, then the appli-
cation of state rules in the state courts threatens no federal inter-
est. 6 Preservation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction would war-
rant only a refusal by the Court to treat a state court's finding of
harmlessness as an adequate state ground; it would not warrant
imposing any limitation upon what harmless error rule the states
may apply in their own courts. So in the end, this theory, too, can-
not account for Chapman.9 7
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON
LAW
A. Does the Chapman Doctrine Confer a Constitutionally Re-
quired Remedy?
I suggested earlier that appellate review (and the accompany-
ing disposition of reversal for prejudicial error) implicates a ques-
tion of remedies for constitutional violations.9 Constitutional
202-06 (1960). This approach would leave the Supreme Court free to review a judgment
without requiring the state courts, in the exercise of any appellate or post-conviction juris-
diction, to follow the Chapman standard.
See Meltzer, 99 Harv L Rev at 1176-85 (cited in note 47).
See id at 1183-84, 1190-96.
Compare Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground:
Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 S Ct Rev 187, 233 (asserting that a finding that a
state ground is inadequate determines whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
the federal claim, "not whether the state may adhere to the rule in future cases").
'7 Moreover, an explanation of Chapman based upon the need to protect Supreme
Court jurisdiction would not explain why the Court should ever treat a constitutional error
as calling for automatic reversal. See, for example, Sullivan v Louisiana, 113 S Ct 2078,
2081 (1993) (stating that total deprivation of the right to counsel, trial by a biased judge,
and denial of the right to self-representation are errors requiring automatic reversal).
" See text accompanying notes 68-71.
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rights in criminal cases typically govern the behavior of trial
courts;9 9 for example, a trial court could not, consistently with the
Constitution, comment on the defendant's failure to testify on the
theory that, in light of the overwhelming proof of guilt, any error
would be harmless. 100 The question of harmlessness arises after an
error has been found on appeal, or following post-trial motions.10 1
Thus, post-conviction relief (whether on appeal or otherwise) is
most easily characterized as one kind of remedy for a constitu-
tional violation. Just as damages in a constitutional tort suit re-
dress a prior violation by a government official, reversal on appeal,
redresses a prior violation at trial. The doctrine of harmless error
thus helps determine when that remedy must be provided.
The question then arises whether Chapman can be understood
as a constitutionally required remedy. Richard Fallon and I have
argued that there are constitutional imperatives as to the provision
of constitutional remedies, and that the "doctrine" here, although
lacking sharp edges, should be and to a considerable extent is or-
" Of course, many constitutional provisions regulate police behavior and protect indi-
viduals' privacy and dignity whether or not prosecution ensues. Yet even some of those
constitutional protections-for example, those provided by Miranda, or those prohibiting
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures-come into being only with the trial
court's admission of the evidence. See Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1774-75 & n
231 (cited in note 44); Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution:
Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evi-
dence, 87 Mich L Rev 907, 917 (1989). Thus, for example, suits under 42 USC § 1983 seek-
ing damages against police officers who conducted unnecessarily suggestive lineups, or inter-
rogations in disregard of the Miranda rules, have almost universally been found wanting
when the evidence thus obtained was never introduced at trial. See, for example, Hensley v
Carey, 818 F2d 646, 648-50 (7th Cir 1987); Warren v City of Lincoln, 864 F2d 1436, 1442
(8th Cir 1989) (en banc). But see Cooper v Dupnik, 963 F2d 1220, 1251-52 (9th Cir 1992)
(en banc) (police conduct during interrogation that violates not only Miranda rules but
"core" 5th and 14th Amendment rights to be free from coercion gives rise to § 1983 dam-
ages action, even if the coerced statements were never introduced in a criminal trial). At
least one court has gone further than the prevailing rule, finding that a constitutional tort
action for damages does not lie even when the plaintiff alleges that statements obtained in
violation of Miranda were introduced at trial, See Bennett v p'assic, 545 F2d 1260, 1262-63
(10th Cir 1976).
In the case of the Fourth Amendment, I have elsewhere expressed my view that the
violation has occurred when the illegal search occurs, and the exclusion of evidence does not
prevent the violation so much as it provides a form of redress. See generally Daniel J. Melt-
zer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and De-
fendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 Colum L Rev 247, 267-78 (1988).
100 See Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1771 (cited in note 44).
101 See id. Of course, an appellate court is free, where an alleged error would be harm-
less in any event, to affirm without determining whether a violation occurred. See, for exam-
ple, Milton v Wainwright, 407 US 371, 372 (1972); United States v Pravato, 505 F2d 703,
704 (2d Cir 1974).
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ganized around two basic remedial imperatives.1 2 The first imper-
ative is "to redress individual violations"--as reflected in the slo-
gan, "for every right, a remedy."' 03 The second imperative is "to
reinforce structural values, including those underlying the separa-
tion of powers and the rule of law.!' 0 4 Neither imperative, how-
ever, calls for remediation in every case; both can and do yield to
countervailing governmental interests, albeit in different ways.1 5
Thus, the constitutional imperatives are both qualified and neces-
sarily somewhat imprecise when applied in particular cases.
There are two additional difficulties involved in fleshing out
these imperatives. First, the Constitution often requires some ade-
quate remedy but not necessarily any particular one.1 6 Redress for
unconstitutional searches and seizures, for example, could be pro-
vided by an exclusionary rule, a vigorous system of tort damages
remedies, or some system of administrative review and personnel
regulation. 107 Second, a particular court's remedial authority is
rarely understood as being limited to providing that redress which
is absolutely essential under the governing substantive law. Courts
ordinarily have authority to issue remedies that are appropriate
even where not strictly necessary. 08 This principle is widely recog-
nized in suits for structural injunctions, in which the entire idea of
a remedy that would restore plaintiffs to their rightful positions
had no violation occurred, though sometimes articulated in the
cases, 10 9 is difficult to sustain." 0 Indeed, the question whether a
particular remedy that a court has chosen to afford for a constitu-
102 See Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1777-91 (cited in note 44).
os The origins of this slogan in Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803),
are discussed in Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1787.
1" Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1787.
'01 Thus, the first imperative is sometimes simply trumped by countervailing considera-
tions-as when immunity doctrines leave the victim of a constitutional tort unable to collect
damages, even if damages are the only conceivable remedy. The second imperative does not
require that a remedy be provided in every case, but merely that the overall structure of
remedies be sufficiently robust to keep government within the bounds of law. See generally
id at 1779-87.
10 See Hart, 66 Harv L Rev at 1366 (cited in note 64) ("Congress necessarily has a wide
choice in the selection of remedies, and [ ] a complaint about [the denial of one remedy
while another is left open] can rarely be of constitutional dimension.").
107 See Meltzer, 88 Colum L Rev at 294 n 260 (cited in note 99).
100 See, for example, Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678, 687-88 (1978) (approving a wide-
ranging equitable decree designed to eliminate cruel and unusual prison conditions over a
dissent objecting that the decree enjoined practices not themselves unconstitutional). See
also text accompanying notes 127-34, discussing the Bivens remedy.
log See, for example, Milliken v Bradley, 433 US 267, 280 (1977); Dayton Board of
Education v Brinkman, 433 US 406, 420 (1977).
110 See, for example, Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
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tional violation is constitutionally necessary, or instead is merely
appropriate, rarely arises as such. The question is sharply put only
when the legislature attempts to preclude provision of that
remedy.'
But quite apart from all of the qualifications of any constitu-
tional right to particular remedies, Chapman is hard to understand
as a rule of constitutionally mandated remediation. For if the Con-
stitution does not mandate appeals at all, surely it does not man-
date provision, when appeals are provided as a matter of grace, of
the remedy of appellate reversal under the particular standard set
forth in Chapman.
B. Chapman as Constitutional Common Law
What, then, is the best explanation for the Chapman rule? My
own view is that the harmless error rule should be seen as constitu-
tional common law. Professor Monaghan, who has set forth most
generally the theory of constitutional common law, has so declared,
though without much elaboration. 11 2 His conclusion relied primar-
ily upon the Court's statement in Chapman that Congress might
have the power to modify the standard the Court there announced.
A rule that could be legitimately modified by the legislature did
not appear to be a "real" constitutional holding." 3 I have sug-
gested that even had the Court made no such statement, there
'would be no firm basis for understanding the Chapman decision as
a constitutional mandate. Thus, understanding Chapman instead
as constitutional common law seems to me the only plausible
alternative.
89 Harv L Rev 1281, 1304-07 (1976); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution:
Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L J 635, 668-91 (1982).
"I See, for example, Meltzer, 88 Colum L Rev at 293 (cited in note 99); Walter E.
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As a Sword, 85 Harv L Rev 1532,
1548 (1972).
112 In 1989, Professor Monaghan stated in passing that Chapman is an example of con-
stitutional common law. See Monaghan, 1989 S Ct Rev at 200 n 30 (cited in note 14). His
original article on constitutional common law gave only a hint that the Chapman rule might
be so regarded. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Con-
stitutional Common Law, 89 Harv L Rev 1, 20-21 & n 112 (1975).
I" See Monaghan, 89 Harv L Rev at 17 (stating that the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause cases are "wholly subject to congressional revision"). See also text accompanying
notes 4-6. In earlier writing, I followed him in this regard. See Meltzer, 88 Colum L Rev at
279 n 166 (cited in note 99) ("One possibility is that Chapman is a constitutional common-
law decision .... A second possibility is that the Supreme Court was simply confused.").
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Although the idea of constitutional common law has drawn
critics,"1 4 I remain persuaded by its basic validity and importance.
I have explained my views in earlier writing1 5 and so shall not re-
peat them in full here. I would simply like to highlight several
points about the appropriateness' of formulating harmless error
rules as constitutional common law.
First, as Professor Monaghan has noted, although Congress
has power to prescribe remedies for constitutional violations, it
tends to defer to the courts in the elaboration of civil liberties mat-
ters. 1 6 Numerous obstacles stand in the way of legislative action,
"the most important of which are the power of inertia, the lack of
time, and the futility of all-encompassing statutory codes."'1 7
Thus, willy-nilly, the courts are the primary actors in this area.
And "ensuring adequate protection of constitutionally rooted in-
terests and of achieving self-regulating official behavior may make
it desirable for the Court itself to frame at least some part of the
appropriate procedures .... The important point is that the Court
need not assume that any particular rule is a necessary component
of due process to justify its imposition."" 8
Second, courts may claim a distinctive expertise in the formu-
lation of remedies. Remedies by their nature respond to the nature
and scope of violations and a particular party's demand for re-
lief,"9 and courts have a particular expertise in fashioning the nec-
essary connections.' 2 0
Of course, when federal courts formulate rules for state courts,
they are not simply acting where Congress has failed to act. The
decision in Chapman, for example, requires state courts to act in
contravention of state harmless error rules that would otherwise
govern. But the imposition of a federal standard of harmless error
is a far less intrusive matter than, for example, mandating a right
to appeal in criminal cases. Indeed, the Court's refusal to recognize
a right to a criminal appeal may have been influenced by doubts
about the desirability of constitutionalizing an expensive proce-
dure, and by concerns about imposing that burden upon a state
"' See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts,
52 U Chi L Rev 1, 54-59 (1985); Thomas S. Schrock and Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering
the Constitutional Common Law, 91 Harv L Rev 1117, 1126-45 (1978).
,,5 See Meltzer, 99 Harv L Rev at 1172-76 (cited in note 47).
1,6 See Monaghan, 89 Harv L Rev at 18-19 (cited in note 112).
117 Meltzer, 88 Colum L Rev at 288 (cited in note 99).
,18 Monaghan, 89 Harv L Rev at 26.
1,9 See Chayes, 89 Harv L Rev at 1308 (cited in note 110).
1 0 See Meltzer, 88 Colum L Rev at 287-88.
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that would not otherwise provide an appeal. But so long as a state
has created a system of appeals, it is far less intrusive to mandate
application therein of a particular harmless error rule. Indeed, the
state courts would have a harmless error rule in any event; the
Court is merely tinkering with the standard to be applied.
That tinkering must be justified by the fear that state courts,
left to their own devices, would unduly dilute federal constitu-
tional norms by too easily finding errors to be harmless. This con-
cern is not one divined only by the Chapman Court. The existence
of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction itself reflects doubts that
state courts, left to their own devices, would adequately enforce
federal constitutional norms.12' Many federal constitutional norms
are neither intuitive nor already accepted as part of state systems
of criminal justice. Those systems may resist recognition and en-
forcement of such norms. One form of resistance is to shield con-
victions by application of overly broad conceptions of harmless
error. Chapman tends to counteract such resistance, both by im-
posing a strict standard for finding errors to be harmless and by
subjecting state court applications of that standard to the possibil-
ity of federal review by the Supreme Court or by federal habeas
corpus courts. 22
Harmless error standards are rather fact-specific, and so even
adopting the Chapman rule is hardly a guarantee of vigorous en-
forcement of fedeial rights. As Justice Stevens noted recently in
Brecht v Abrahamson, "the way we phrase the governing standard
is far less important than the quality of the judgment with which it
is applied."'123 Determining whether an error is harmless under any
standard is not likely to create clear rules that will be helpful in
future cases, and so in any particular case a reviewing court's de-
121 See Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 306-07 (1989) (plurality opinion); Mackey v United
States, 401 US 667, 687 (1971) (Harlan, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part); Desist v United States, 394 US 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan dissenting); Larry W.
Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 NYU L Rev 991, 1031-40 (1985). Of course, in recent
years the Court has been quite schizophrenic in its vision of the relation of federal habeas
and state courts. With the cases just cited, compare Brecht v Abrahamson, 113 S Ct 1710,
1721 (1993), and Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 493-94 & n 35 (1976) (both rejecting the
premise that habeas review is necessary to ensure that state courts faithfully apply federal
constitutional norms).
12 In theory, insofar as federal habeas courts stand ready to apply Chapman with
greater vigor, that may create some greater incentive for state courts to do so in the first
instance. In practice, the threat of habeas reversal may not be so potent. See Daniel Melt-
zer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S Cal L Rev 2507, 2523-31
(1993) (noting that only a very small percentage of state prisoners file habeas corpus peti-
tions, and that relief is granted to a still smaller percentage).
123 113 S Ct at 1725 (Stevens concurring).
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termination is rather open-textured. It is no doubt for that reason,
in part, that a number of commentators think that in practice
many courts (federal as well as state, but perhaps state courts par-
ticularly) have diluted the Chapman standard. 12 4 In turn, such di-
lution may affect the likelihood of violations in the first instance; a
prosecutor will be less alert to avoid potential error if she is con-
vinced that any error is likely to be found harmless. 125 So, in prac-
tice, Chapman may have created a less effective remedial scheme
than many would have hoped. If so, one might view this result as
counseling against the wisdom of Chapman. Alternatively, and I
think more plausibly, one might take it as evidence that strict lim-
its on the willingness to deem errors harmless are an important, if
not entirely effective, counterweight to the pro-affirmance tenden-
cies of state criminal courts. 26
C. Chapman and Bivens
I would like to draw particular attention to the link between
Chapman and the Bivens line of cases. An appellant attacking an
adverse judgment is seeking affirmative relief against a past wrong,
not unlike a plaintiff suing the government for damages in a con-
stitutional tort action. 2 7 Thus, it seems highly plausible to analo-
124 See Allen, 70 Iowa L Rev at 331-32 (cited in note 17); Stacy and Dayton, 88 Colun
L Rev at 127-31 (cited in note 13).
'125 For example, in United States v Pallais, 921 F2d 684, 691 (7th Cir 1991), the prose-
cutor, in closing argument, "made the standard misstep and commented on [the defend-
ant's] failure to take the stand." Although noting that "[w]e rebuke prosecutors repeatedly
for commenting on a defendant's failure to take the stand . . . , [and that] [t]en years ago
we were commenting on a 'sense of futility from persistent disregard of prior admonitions,'"
the court, per Judge Posner, remarked that "[t]hese rebukes seem to have little effect, no
doubt because of the harmless error rule, which in this as in many other cases precludes an
effective remedy for prosecutorial misconduct. The expansive code of constitutional criminal
procedure that the Supreme Court has created in the name of the Constitution is like the
grapes of Tantalus, since the equally expansive harmless error rule in most cases prevents a
criminal defense from obtaining any benefit from the code." Id at 691-92 (citations omitted).
See also, for example, Dortch v O'Leary, 863 F2d 1337, 1343-45 (7th Cir 1988).
126 See, for example, Thomas Y. Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and
Decision-Making Norms in a California Court of Appeal, 1982 Am Bar Found Res J 543,
591-95, 612.
127 Indeed, the similarity may have been even clearer when trial court judgments were
reviewed via a writ of error rather than a modern appeal. The writ of error was viewed as
original action seeking relief against unlawful action, rather than as a continuation of the
case after trial. See Cohens v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 409-10 (1821); Sunderland, 5
Tex L Rev at 139-40 (cited in note 84). See also Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600, 610-11 (1974),
citing McKane v Durston, 153 US 684 (1894) ("[I]t is ordinarily the defendant, rather than
the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the
State's prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made by a judge or jury below.
The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him against being
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gize rules regulating the provision of relief to the appellant to rules
authorizing the provision of damages relief in Bivens actions. 128
One could imagine a system in which the remedy for any con-
stitutional violation suffered by a criminal defendant was a suit for
damages against the responsible actor (the judge or prosecutor).
To be sure, damages might be inferior to reversal as a form of indi-
vidual redress. 29 But whatever its hypothetical merits or demerits,
a vigorous system of tort remedies does not exist.130 The scope of
governmental liability is quite limited,' 3' and judges and prosecu-
'haled into court' by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence, but rather as a
sword to upset the prior determination of guilt. This difference is significant for, while no
one would agree that the State may simply dispense with the trial stage of proceedings
without a criminal defendant's consent, it is clear that the State need not provide any ap-
peal at all.").
128 To be sure, Bivens cases are brought in federal court while most criminal cases are
litigated in state court. However, if Bivens cases were brought in state court and not re-
moved under 28 USC § 1442, as in fact they almost invariably are, see Bivens v Six Un-
known Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 US 388, 391 & n 4 (1971) (noting the Justice Depart-
ment's policy of removing state tort actions against federal agents to federal court), the state
courts would have an obligation to hear them and to provide relief. See Hill, 69 Colum L
Rev at 1160 (cited in note 64); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Dam-
ages Claims, 75 Va L Rev 1117, 1131 (1989).
129 Plainly, damages are not an adequate remedy for someone unconstitutionally sen-
tenced to prison. Moreover, some violations may not be the direct responsibility of the judge
or prosecutor-for example, ineffective assistance of counsel, or misconduct in the jury
room. Although in some sense the judge may have erred in permitting the sanction of con-
viction to be imposed in such circumstances, where the judge was unaware of the violation,
she would surely not be personally liable in damages. See also note 10, suggesting that in
cases like these there may be a right to some form of post-conviction relief.
130 Like damages relief, injunctive relief against future violations fails to provide indi-
vidual redress to a person who has been unconstitutionally deprived of liberty. Nor is in-
junctive relief generally available to redress constitutional violations by law enforcement
officials. See generally Meltzer, 88 Colum L Rev at 297-98, 314-16 (cited in note 99).
131 Federal sovereign immunity bars unconsented suits against the United States in any
court. See Arnsberg v United States, 757 F2d 971, 980 (9th Cir 1985) (citing cases). Though
Congress has broadly consented to suit, see generally Hart & Wechsler at 1144-58 (cited in
note 3) (outlining the major statutory schemes), its consent does not extend to liability for
constitutional (as distinguished from common law) torts. See id at 1153.
The Eleventh Amendment immunizes state governments from unconsented suit in fed-
eral court, see, for example, Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 237-40
(1985), unless Congress has exercised a constitutional power to abrogate that immunity. See,
for example, Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co., 491 US 1, 9-13 (1989). In addition, the Court
has interpreted 42 USC § 1983 as not creating a right of action for damages against state
governments. See Will v Michigan State Police, 491 US 58, 62-71 (1989). That decision,
together with Jett v Dallas Independent School District, 491 US 701, 731-36 (1989) (hold-
ing that the § 1983 cause of action for damages is the exclusive federal remedy against state
governments for violations of the rights guaranteed in 42 USC § 1981), indicates rather
clearly that there are neither express nor implied federal damages remedies against state
governments for constitutional torts. See Hart & Wechsler Supplement at 185-86 (cited in
note 57).
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tors enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability.1 3 2 Indeed,
one of the justifications for conferring absolute immunity on par-
ticipants in the criminal process is that defendants have the alter-
native remedy of reversal on appeal.3 3 Thus, at least under current
law, for criminal defendants whose rights are violated at trial, it is
"reversal or nothing.' 3 4
The Chapman rule thus fortifies the remedy provided to per-
sons who are victimized by unconstitutional conduct at their crimi-
nal trials. Like Bivens, it does not seek to force courts that lack
jurisdiction to take it, for just as Bivens presupposes federal courts
that have subject matter jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1331,135
Chapman presupposes that state appellate courts have been given
jurisdiction over criminal appeals. Instead, Chapman, like Bivens,
asks courts to exercise their jurisdiction in a fashion thought ap-
propriate for the vindication of federal constitutional rights. Thus,
Chapman seems to me justified in much the same way that Bivens
is.
The analogy, like most analogies, is hardly perfect. One might
suggest, for example, that there is less need for remediation in the
post-conviction context, where the violation occurred in the course
of a judicial proceeding in which an impartial adjudicator found
that no constitutional violation had occurred. Thus, even without
the implication of additional constitutional remedies, the defend-
ant will ordinarily already have had the opportunity for judicial
review of his entire claim. 36
But this picture of adjudication in state trial courts is, in
many instances, quite idealized. Some constitutional errors may
arise from rapid rulings on evidentiary issues at trial, in which the
opportunity for considered argument and judgment is very slim in-
deed-or in circumstances in which the judge is the subject of crit-
icism, calling into question judicial disinterestedness. Moreover,
the particular seriousness of an official condemnation for criminal
conduct, and the sanctions that typically accompany a judgment of
132 See, for example, Stump v Sparkman, 435 US 349, 362-64 (1978) (judicial immu-
nity); Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409, 424-31 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity).
M' See Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547, 554 (1967); Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government:
Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 90 (Yale, 1983).
M Compare Bivens, 403 US at 410 (Harlan concurring in the judgment) ("For people
in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing.").
131 In theory, Bivens actions can also be brought in state courts of general jurisdiction.
See note 128.
138 1 say ordinarily because there may be some violations that occur outside of the judi-
cial process, or for which the trial process is not an adequate remedy. See notes 10 and 129.
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criminality, suggest that judicially-implied remedies are especially
necessary in the criminal process. 137
A second question about the analogy is whether, if state legis-
latures could constitutionally repeal criminal appeals, Congress
could constitutionally preclude all Bivens actions. Such an asser-
tion would be very controversial. First, a key purpose of constitu-
tional remedies is to create a system of redress adequate to ensure
that government generally respects constitutional requirements. 138
Because constitutional tort remedies serve this purpose (albeit in-
completely)' 39 their elimination would be constitutionally suspect,
at least absent the provision of some alternative form of redress.
Second, Bivens remedies contribute importantly to the more famil-
iar remedial goal of providing effective redress to individual vic-
tims of constitutional violations.140 Finally, in many cases adequate
alternatives do not exist, as Justice Harlan noted in Bivens: "For
people in Bivens' shoes [an innocent victim of an isolated violation
of the Fourth Amendment, not redressable by either injunction or
exclusion of evidence at trial], it is damages or nothing.''
But though there are strong reasons of principle to doubt
whether Congress could preclude Bivens actions altogether, there
is very little in Supreme Court opinions that would give rise to
such doubts-either in Bivens itself, 42 in the subsequent cases rec-
ognizing significant limits upon Bivens remedies in the name of
legislative policy, 143 or in the Court's broad immunity doctrines,
"I See text accompanying note 41.
138 See text accompanying notes 98-105.
19 See Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1788 (cited in note 44).
140 See id at 1787.
141 Bivens, 403 US at 410 (Harlan concurring in the judgment).
142 See Meltzer, 99 Harv L Rev at 1172 (cited in note 47); Monaghan, 89 Harv L Rev at
23-24 (cited in note 112). For the contrary argument, see Dellinger, 85 Harv L Rev at 1557
(cited in note 111); Schrock and Welsh, 91 Harv L Rev at 1135-38 (cited in note 114).
143 See, for example, Schweiker v Chilicky, 487 US 412, 424-29 (1988); United States v
Stanley, 483 US 669, 678-84 (1987); Chappell v Wallace, 462 US 296, 298-305 (1983).
Some language in Davis v Passman, 442 US 228 (1979), could be viewed as looking the
other way. The Court there stated that unless constitutional rights "are to become merely
precatory," litigants who have no other "effective means" to enforce their rights "must be
able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts . . . ." Id at 242. But even that lan-
guage appeared in a part of the opinion finding that the plaintiff had a cause of action; the
succeeding portion of the opinion proceeded to inquire whether a damages remedy should
be provided, and the standard applied was one of appropriateness rather than necessity. See
id at 245-48. A number of other influential opinions likewise treat the question of damages
as one of remedial discretion. See, for example, Bivens, 403 US at 407 (Harlan concurring in
the judgment); Carlson v Green, 446 US 14, 18-19 & n 5, 22 n 10 (1980); id at 26-29 (Powell
concurring in the judgment); Davis, 442 US at 252 (Powell dissenting); Bush v Lucas, 462
US 367, 373 (1983) (rejecting both (1) the view that federal courts should "fashion an ade-
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which severely restrict the reach of the Bivens remedy.14 4 For ex-
ample, the cases repeatedly state that a Bivens remedy should not
be recognized where there are "special factors counselling hesita-
tion in the absence of affirmative action by Congress'"45-without
suggesting that such factors must be of sufficient power to out-
weigh a presumptive constitutional entitlement to the remedy.146
quate remedy for every wrong" and (2) the view that federal courts lack power to grant
relief not expressly authorized by Congress, in favor of the view that judicial power "is to be
exercised in the light of relevant policy determinations made by the Congress").
See also George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs-Have
the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 Ind L J 263, 269-74, 289, 291 n 206 (1989) (noting that
Bivens did not rest originally on a clearly constitutional ground and noting that recent cases
so suggest). Brown observes that some cases show "traces" of the Court's evaluating a legis-
latively provided scheme and finding it to be as good as a Bivens remedy, or at least "ade-
quate" under some constitutional standard. Id at 276-77. See, for example, Bush, 462 US at
378 n 14 (stating that existing civil service remedies were "clearly constitutionally ade-
quate"); but see Chilicky, 487 US at 425 (holding that remedies provided by Congress are
meaningful). But Brown stresses that for the most part, the Court, when refusing to recog-
nize a Bivens action because of the subject matter or because of congressional action, has
not determined the adequacy of alternative remedies. Brown, 64 Ind L J at 276-77. See, for
example, Stanley, 483 US at 683-84.
1,4 See, for example, Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 813-19 (1982); Butz v Econo-
mou, 438 US 478, 504-17 (1978); Stump v Sparkman, 435 US 349, 362-64 (1978); Imbler v
Pachtman, 424 US 409, 424-31 (1976).
'45 Bivens, 403 US at 396; see also Carlson, 446 US at 18 (quoting Bivens); Davis, 442
US at 245 (same).
If the Court's decisions limiting the remedy do not seem to proceed on the assumption
that the remedy is constitutionally required, neither do its decisions recognizing the remedy.
For example, the Court in Carlson v Green, 446 US 14 (1980), recognized a Bivens remedy
even though Congress had provided a remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act. That
statutory remedy was said to have many disadvantages as compared to the Bivens remedy,
id at 20-23, although the Court overlooked ways in which the FTCA remedy might provide
superior redress to individual claimants (for example, it provides for governmental rather
than individual liability). But Bush v Lucas deemed a legislatively provided remedy with
almost all the same defects to be constitutionally adequate, and on that basis held that a
Bivens remedy need not be provided. See 462 US 367, 385-90 (1983). The major distinction
between the statutory remedies in Bush and Carlson is that it appears that the former
defined liability for constitutional violations, see Bush at 386-89, while the latter provided
redress for common law torts that overlapped with constitutional violations. See Carlson,
446 US at 19-23. Yet in Carlson there was no finding that on the facts of the case the
redress for common law torts would not adequately redress the alleged constitutional
violation.
146 There is a way in which one might try to reconcile these limits of the Bivens remedy
with a more general argument that the remedy is, at least to some extent, constitutionally
required. The reconciliation would proceed as follows: a broad constitutional imperative un-
derlies the Bivens damages remedy; the principle, however, is not absolute, see Fallon and
Meltzer, 104 Harv L Rev at 1787-91 (cited in note 44); Congress has broad power to provide
substitute remedies, see text accompanying notes 138-47; and the remedial imperative must
yield to compelling state interests-such as very strong showings of legislative need to limit
or displace the remedy (as in order to provide the protection secured by immunity
doctrines).
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I do not wish to go so far as to argue that the Bivens regime is
entirely subconstitutional and therefore subject to complete pre-
clusion by Congress. But at the very least, I think one can say that
the current Bivens regime has been created on the assumption that
the Court has considerable powers to fashion remedies, as federal
common law, even where they are not clearly constitutionally re-
quired. 47 And if the Court is justified in establishing remedial im-
peratives in constitutional tort actions, why may it not establish
remedial imperatives in criminal appeals? That, I suggest, is ex-
actly what the Court has done.
V. IMPLICATIONS
What implications would acceptance of this analysis have for
future doctrinal developments? Let me close by focusing on three
points in particular.
A. The Future of Chapman
Earlier I noted that the present Court seems unlikely to an-
nounce that there is a constitutional right to an appeal in a crimi-
nal case. 148 If so, and if the Court agrees that the harmless error
rule cannot be justified as constitutionally required, is the Court
likely nonetheless to maintain that rule under the reasoning I have
just sketched?
The Court has not spoken clearly about whether it accepts the
existence or legitimacy of constitutional common law, but in sev-
eral respects the Court could be viewed as inhospitable to it. At
I find that argument not unattractive, but still difficult to square with the decided
cases. First, there remains the problem that the cases do not go far toward announcing that
Bivens is constitutionally required, or that there are constitutional constraints applicable in
cases in which the Court is asked not to recognize a Bivens remedy. Similarly, the cases
recognizing immunities have not proceeded by treating the remedy as constitutionally re-
quired and then seeing how far compelling state interests require its limitation via immun-
ity; rather, the Court has viewed itself as having authority to fashion policy as it sees fit.
See, for example, Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 US 731, 747-48 (1982).
"I See Meltzer, 99 Harv L Rev at 1172-74 (cited in note 47); Monaghan, 89 Harv L Rev
at 23-24 (cited in note 112); Note, The Scope of Bush v. Lucas: An Examination of Con-
gressional Remedies for Whistleblowers, 88 Colum L Rev 587, 602 (1988); Brown, 64 Ind L
J at 294 (cited in note 143). Then-Justice Rehnquist made this point long ago when he
criticized Bivens in Carlson. See 446 US at 53 (Rehnquist dissenting).
Professor Nichol prefers to view Bivens as constitutionally required, so that Congress's
power is limited to displacing the Bivens remedy with substitutes that satisfy some test of
constitutional adequacy. See Nichol, 75 Va L Rev at 1142-43 (cited in note 128). He recog-
nizes, however, that his preferred reading conflicts with the case law. See id.
148 See note 46.
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the most general level, the Court is increasingly moved by claims
of federalism and related arguments for limits on the power of fed-
eral judges to tie the hands of the states or the political branches.
In the narrower area of federal common law, its decisions, though
not all of a piece,'4 9 reflect a restrictive conception of the appropri-
ateness of federal judges fashioning rules of decision. And in the
area of criminal process, it has recently imposed limits upon, and
expressed doubts about the proper scope of, federal supervisory
power (itself a kind of federal common law, but one limited to the
federal courts). 50
But the alternatives to recognizing the common law basis for
Chapman and the Bivens cases are not attractive for the Court.
One alternative is to overrule these decisions-which would be un-
comfortable, to say the least, in view of (a) the failure of any of the
Justices to question Chapman's continuing authority in two deci-
sions last Term,'5 ' and (b) more general concerns about stare deci-
sis. 52 A second alternative is to treat these decisions as constitu-
tionally required. Such a holding would ultimately be far more
dramatic, and would place limits upon the state and federal sys-
tems of criminal justice that Congress is not free to change. 153
I do not claim to have a crystal ball in these matters. But I do
believe that Chapman and Bivens, unless jettisoned, will force the
149 See, for example, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield, 490 US 30, 43-
53 (1989); Boyle v United Technologies Corp., 487 US 500, 504-13 (1988).
1'" In United States v Williams, 112 S Ct 1735 (1992), the Court declined (in a 5-4
decision) to exercise its "supervisory power" to prescribe standards of prosecutorial conduct
before a grand jury. The grand jury, the Court said, was an institution separate from the
courts and any judicial authority to fashion rules of grand jury procedure did not extend to
the rule adopted by the court below, which would have required a prosecutor to present
available exculpatory evidence if that evidence were "substantial." See id at 1742-44.
After rejecting the supervisory power argument, the Court proceeded, in a separate sec-
tion of the opinion, to hold that the rule sought by the defendant could not be justified "as
a sort of Fifth Amendment 'common law.'" Id at 1744. Yet it is possible to read the opinion
as not foreclosing the possibility that such common law might be appropriate in other cir-
cumstances. For the court did not simply say that such common law was illegitimate. To the
contrary, it analyzed the merits and demerits of the proposed rule, and determined that the
rule was substantively unjustified, see id at 1744-46. It did, however, finish by stating that:
"For the reasons set forth above, however, we conclude that courts have no authority to
prescribe such a duty pursuant to their inherent supervisory authority over their own pro-
ceedings." Id at 1746. One might well think that reservations on making common law deci-
sions that restrict the state courts would follow a fortiori.
.1 See text accompanying notes 18-20.
182 Compare Planned Parenthood v Casey, 112 S Ct 2791, 2808-16 (1992) (opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter), refusing to overrule Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973), on
the grounds of stare decisis.
153 See Meltzer, 88 Colum L Rev at 293-94 (cited in note 99); Monaghan, 89 Harv L
Rev at 29 (cited in note 112).
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Court at some point to confront, and I hope recognize the legiti-
macy of, constitutional common law.
B. Federal Harmless Error Rules in Civil Cases
The foregoing analysis might be thought to present a puzzle:
Why hasn't the Supreme Court federalized the harmless error rules
applied by state courts in civil cases involving errors of federal
constitutional law? Suppose, for example, that a state trial court
misstated somewhat the governing law under New York Times v
Sullivan, 1 5 but a state appellate court affirmed a judgment against
the defendant, finding any error not to have been prejudicial
within the meaning of state harmless error rules. The arguments
just offered for understanding Chapman as a federal common law
rule would seem, at least when taken at a high level of generality,
to apply equally to civil cases. Yet I have been unable to find any
Supreme Court decisions even raising the question whether a fed-
eral standard governs the determination of the harmlessness of a
federal constitutional error in a state civil case.
My own explanation is not that the cases fundamentally differ
in any analytical way, but rather that the Court's situation sense is
that no such federal intervention is necessary to protect federal
rights. Constitutional rules are much less pervasive in civil cases,
so that fewer occasions would arise for such intervention in the
first instance.. Moreover, the constitutional rules in civil cases are
more likely in some sense to go to the "merits" (as does New York
Times v Sullivan, which relates to the question of the defendant's
fault) than to issues less central to a determination of guilt or in-
nocence (for example, exclusion of probative evidence). They may,
therefore, not generate the same kind of resistance from state
courts. Finally, we may have a higher tolerance for a slim possibil-
ity that constitutional error affected the outcome when the case is
civil rather than criminal;155 hence, concerns that state courts may
be generous in forgiving constitutional error may be less problem-
atic in civil cases. But if these kinds of explanations are correct,
they surely would not, and should not, stand in the way of formu-
lating more robust federal standards in civil cases in which the
risks of dilution seem especially serious or troublesome.
154 376 US 254 (1964).
155 Compare In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process
Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to support a crimi-
nal conviction).
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C. Harmless Error Doctrines in Criminal Cases
Would recognition of Chapman as a rule of constitutional
common law be likely to change the outcome of particular criminal
cases involving application of harmless error doctrine? Justice
Holmes famously reminded us that "[g]eneral propositions do not
decide concrete cases."'15 I doubt that acceptance of the analysis I
have provided would necessarily have changed any Justice's vote
about whether, for example, automatic reversal is required when a
coerced confession is erroneously introduced at trial,157 or when the
jury is not properly instructed on the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.1
58
The decision in Brecht v Abrahamson' 9 last Term, however,
presented an issue that might have come out differently had the
Court paid more careful attention to the underpinnings of Chap-
man. There the Court divided 5-4 in holding that when federal
courts determine, under their habeas corpus jurisdiction, whether a
federal constitutional error infected a state criminal conviction, an
error should be deemed harmless unless it "had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict"' 60 -a
standard less protective of criminal defendants than the Chapman
standard applied on direct review. Justice Stevens joined the ma-
jority and wrote a separate concurrence, which may reflect some
discomfort with the Court's opinion, or a desire that lower courts
interpret that opinion in a fashion sympathetic to the claims of
habeas petitioners. Justice Stevens's opinion stressed that the
standard fashioned by the Court "places the burden on prosecutors
to explain why [ ] errors were harmless; requires a habeas court to
review the entire record de novo; [ ] leaves considerable latitude
for the exercise of judgment by federal courts"; and "is appropri-
ately demanding.' ' 6 '
I fully agree with Justice Stevens's observation, in Brecht, that
differences in doctrinal formulations of standards of review are elu-
sive in application. 6 2 But had the Court discussed the basis for
Chapman, rather than simply treating it as an accepted rule seem-
"' Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes dissenting).
157 Arizona v Fulminante, 111 S Ct 1246, 1261 (1991), discussed in text accompanying
note 15.
158 Sullivan v Louisiana, 113 S Ct 2078 (1993), discussed in text accompanying notes
18-20.
159 113 S Ct 1710 (1993).
Id at 1714, quoting Kotteakos v United States, 328 US 750, 776 (1946).
'61 113 S Ct at 1723.
162 See text accompanying note 123.
1994]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ingly devoid of any purpose, perhaps one of the Justices in the
bare majority of five would have had more difficulty in "dis-
count[ing the defendant's] argument that [state] courts will re-
spond to our ruling by violating their Article VI duty to uphold the
Constitution," or in dismissing the contention that a contrary deci-
sion in Brecht might deter lower federal or state courts from fail-
ing fully to enforce constitutional rights.163 For Chapman itself
rested upon a specific and practical concern that protection of con-
stitutional rights in criminal cases is subject to hydraulic pressures,
which may incline courts to find, all too easily, that violations of
constitutional rights were harmless. And as I noted earlier, the rec-
ognition that Chapman addressed that concern would have
dovetailed nicely with what I view as a guiding premise for the
existence of habeas corpus jurisdiction-that there is a particular
reason to fear such hydraulic pressures in state criminal courts.164
It may be too much to suggest that greater attention to the
underpinnings of Chapman would have caused the author of the
Brecht opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, to have come out the
other way, notwithstanding his general desire to restrict the scope
of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Much the same could be said of the
Justices (other than Justice Stevens) who joined with him. For one
should not forget that there is little to prevent five Justices from
deciding a case in whatever way that they like. But at a minimum,
an exploration of the underpinnings of Chapman would have high-
lighted the extent to which Brecht fails to carry forward the
Court's past commitment to fashioning rules of constitutional com-
' ' Brecht, 113 S Ct at 1725 (Stevens concurring). In this regard, the Court, and some
Justices, have been quite inconsistent. Compare Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 306 (1989)
(plurality opinion by O'Connor), citing Desist v United States, 394 US 244, 262-63 (1969)
(Harlan dissenting) (purpose of habeas corpus is to give [state court] trial and appellate
judges throughout the land a necessary incentive to follow established constitutional princi-
ples), and Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 508-10 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter) (Congress gave
the federal habeas courts power to review federal constitutional claims that a state criminal
court had rejected on the merits as a means of enforcing "higher" federal law); with Brecht,
113 S Ct at 1721 (refusing to presume that state court judges are ignoring their oath to
uphold the Constitution and holding that the strict harmless error standard of Chapman v
California, which governs in state courts on direct review of criminal convictions, need not
be applied in habeas corpus cases), and Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 493 n 35 (1976) (dis-
missing both the argument that federal habeas review of state court Fourth Amendment
decisions is necessary to ensure adequate enforcement of the Constitution, and the related
argument "that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional
rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States").
16 See text accompanying note 122. See also Brecht, 113 S Ct at 1727 (White dissent-
ing) (invoking this understanding of habeas corpus jurisdiction to criticize the majority).
Compare the cases cited in note 163.
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mon law that are designed to promote, in a world full of contrary
pressures, the faithful enforcement of federal constitutional
guarantees.

